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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1970, Congress took one of the first significant
steps in addressing the growing concerns over the future of the
environment by enacting The National Environmental Policy
Act.' It was Congress' intention in drafting the act that the
United States government should "use all practicable means ...
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 2-209, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4361 (1988).
(373)
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to create and maintain conditions in which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony." 2  Since the inception of this
congressional mandate, legislation such as the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act,3 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 4 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or
Supeffund) 5 has been enacted in an effort to pursue sound envi-
ronmental policies. However, with the increase in environmental
legislation came an increase in litigation for violations of the fed-
eral regulations.6 Such litigation has given rise to a highly contro-
versial question which has split judicial bodies across the nation:
who is going to pay the price for environmental liability?
Prior to the enactment of the aforementioned legislation,
much of what is today considered "pollution" remained unregu-
lated and unaffected by either state or federal governments. 7 In
the absence of legislative parameters to qualify and quantify envi-
ronmental standards, hazardous waste handlers had few financial
incentives to limit polluting events. With the advent of environ-
mentally related litigation and explicit statutory requirements im-
posing liability expenses upon polluters,8 companies dealing in
hazardous wastes have felt the necessity to either eliminate their
2. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS EDITORIAL STAFF, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AF-
FAIRS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAws 3 (1986).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1988) (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act).
4. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act §§ 1002-9010, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6991 (1988) (RCRA was enacted in 1976 as amendment to Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 98-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965)).
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) [hereinafter CERCLA].
6. "New cleanup standards are not only driving up the costs of remedial
action, but are also delaying further the process of site cleanup by increasing the
number of issues that are being litigated." Cheek, Graham, & Wardzinski, Insur-
ance Coverage for Superfund Liability Defense and Cleanup Costs: The Need for a Nonlitiga-
tion Approach, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10203 (May 1989).
7. Greenberg, Needed: A Fee on Commercial and Industrial Insurance to Finance
Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10254 (June 1989).
8. For example, CERCLA § 107 states the following:
[A]ny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall
be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a state not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
2
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"polluting occurrences" or purchasing liability insurance. More
often than not, paying an annual premium rate to an insurance
liability carrier proved more economical than implementing ways
to control or eliminate polluting events, and thus, a disincentive
to police one's own polluting occurrences has been established
through the use of insurer indemnification. 9
Additionally, under RCRA, owners of hazardous waste treat-
ment, storage, and disposal facilities are required to obtain insur-
ance or to prove the ability to be self insured for third party
claims stemming from "sudden and accidental" occurrences. I0
As has become evident, there has been a marked increase in the
tendency to look to the insurance industry as a convenient source
of funds to finance cleanup expenses in the event of "polluting
occurrences". " I
The insurance industry has attempted to set limits on its in-
demnification liability arising from insured "polluting occur-
rences." Through its experiences with a variety of accident and
occurrence based coverage policies,' 2 insurers ascertained the
need to set explicit standards by which they would not be held
accountable for the often careless, reckless, or at least controlla-
ble polluting events caused by policyholders. From this realiza-
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or
loss resulting from such a release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
Such financial responsibility was unheard of when many of the hazardous
sites, now the subject of litigation, were being created. Financial responsibility
has also been mandated in other federal environmental legislation. See e.g., Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act and Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1321; Deepwa-
ter Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1651; Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.
§ 10927; Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1310-1542.
9. Kunzman, The Insurer as Surrogate Regulator of the Hazardous Waste Industry:
Solution or Perversion?, 20 FORUM 469, 471 (1985). According to the authors, fed-
eral regulations require that limits of liability are at least one million dollars per
occurrence with an annual aggregate of two million dollars. Id. If the facility
may potentially contaminate groundwater, coverage must be three million dol-
lars per occurrence with a six million dollar annual aggregate. Id. These sums
are exclusive of defense costs. However, environmental cleanup expenses and
personal injury claims often cost many times more than limits, depending on the
site. For example, personal injury and property claims arising out of Kepone
contamination in and along the James River have estimated totals exceeding one
hundred billion dollars. Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage
Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 552 (1980); see also Byers v. Baxter, 69 A.D.2d 343, 419
N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979).
10. Kunzman, supra note 9, at 471.
11. In fact, CERCLA provides for the direct assertion of claims against an
insurer (guarantor) provided proof of financial responsibility can be established.
CERCLA § 108(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c).
12. See infra notes 14 & 16 and accompanying text.
19911 375
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tion came the pollution exclusion clause and it's ancillary sudden
and accidental exception into the body of Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability policies (CGLs). t3 The courts, however, have
reached a variety of holdings in their attempts at setting parame-
ters for liability through the exclusion and its exception. This
Comment will address the judicial split with regard to interpret-
ing both the pollution exclusion clause and the sudden and acci-
dental exception.
This Comment will chronicle the historical antecedents of
the exclusionary language to provide a framework of the insur-
ance industry's intent in drafting the provision. This Comment
will then explore the definitional dispute concerning the perti-
nent language of the coverage aspects of the policy, the exclusion,
and the sudden and accidental exception. This will initially be
done by reviewing the actual policy language itself. The diver-
gence ofjudicial opinions will be explored in an extensive review
of cases which elucidate some of the aspects of the arguments for
and against imposing a duty to defend and indemnify insurance
companies for the polluting events of their insureds. The main
focus of the case review will be an examination of the ambiguity
argument proffered by insureds in an effort to impose this duty
upon insurers. The aim of this section will be to establish
whether the pollution exclusion clause and the sudden and acci-
dental exception are reconcilable with the occurrence definition
in the coverage provision of CGL policies. Interpretations of the
pollution exclusion clause and sudden and accidental exception
as independent policy provisions will also be reviewed.
The ancillary issues raised by the threshold question of
whether the exclusion clause and exception are reconcilable with
the occurrence definition will also be explored through case re-
view and commentary. These ancillary issues include the ques-
tion of the meanings to be given to the contract language,
whether knowledge and intent is a requisite for limiting liability to
the insureds for polluting occurrences, and what implications re-
peated occurrences (or the potential for repeated occurrences)
have on the assessment of liability.
This Comment will culminate with an analysis section which
will outline the potential impact current judicial interpretation of
the exclusion and exception may have on the future of CGL poli-
13. See generally Hourihan, supra note 9, at 552-53. For the wording of the
pollution exclusion clause, see infra note 28 and accompanying text.
4
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cies, handlers of hazardous wastes, and the environmental
cleanup effort.
II. DEVELOPING THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The pollution exclusion clause is a product of insurers' expe-
rience with a variety of CGL forms dating back to the mid-1960s.
Prior to 1966, insurance policies were based on an "accident"
perspective which was intended to provide coverage only for sud-
den and accidental discharges of pollutants.14 However, judicial
interpretation of the accident based coverage forms was split,
with a majority of courts finding that a requirement of sudden-
ness was unnecessary to impose an obligation upon insurers to
indemnify their insureds.' 5  In 1966, insurance companies
changed their CGLs from "accident" to "occurrence" based cov-
erage. Occurrence based coverage had previously been em-
ployed only with preferred insureds.16 These policies provided
broader coverage than accident based policies by providing cov-
erage for "injurious exposure to conditions, which result, during
the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither ex-
pected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."'
7
As insurance companies shifted from accident to occurrence
based coverage, the primary issue in pollution claims likewise
shifted. The issue of suddenness was superseded by the issue of
foreseeability and intent of the insured. 18 This shift in emphasis
entailed broadening the scope of coverage which would result in
indemnification. However, such broadening of coverage seemed
safe from the industry's perspective as environmental claims had
not posed a significant concern for insurers at this time.' 9
Judicial interpretation of occurrence based policies combined
with the resulting economic liability from two notable environ-
mental disasters in the late 1960's caused the insurance industry
to reassess the viability of occurrence based coverage. In 1967,
14. Hourihan, supra note 9, at 552.
15. See Note, The Pollution Exclusion in the Comprehensive General Liability Insur-
ance Policy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 904 (1986) (reviews historical antecedents
of pre-exclusionary policy provisions).
16. Id.
17. Hourihan, supra note 9, at 552.
18. Id. at 553.
19. See generally McGEOUGH, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF ACTIONS FOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL DAMAGE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw-DEFENSE AND INSURANCE
PROBLEMS 26 (1977).
1991] 377
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the oiltanker Torrey Canyon ran aground off the coast of England;
in 1969, an oil platform ruptured off the coast of Santa Barbara,
California.20 These disasters caused insurers to incur considera-
ble indemnification costs. 2 ' Further, judicial interpretation of oc-
currence based policies provided additional incentive to redefine
the CGLs.
In Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.,2 2 the
court agreed with an insured's argument that the term "occur-
rence" has broad implications and therefore the duty of insurers
who utilize such broad terminology in their CGLs is also broad-
ened.28 This case, arising from claims that the insured's quarry-
ing operation produced emissions over a seven year period
causing personal injury and property damage, was of further con-
cern to the industry because of the court's opinion that it was
"better not to interpret the word occurrence in a sudden or mo-
mentary sense." 24 Based on the language of the policy, the court
found that the term occurrence should be interpreted as encom-
passing a period of time; therefore, the defendant insurer owed a
duty to defend for damages occurring over a seven year period.2 5
The court concluded that the occurrence based policy provided
20. Kunzman, supra note 9, at 475.
21. Id.
22. 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 289 N.E.2d 360 (1972).
23. Id. at 183, 289 N.E.2d at 364. In adopting the plaintiff's contention
that the term "occurrence" had broader implications than the term "accident,"
the court relied on the following language of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi:
To begin with, the word "occurrence," to the lay mind, as well as to the
judicial mind, has a meaning much broader than the word "acci-
dent."... [A]ccident means something that must have come about or
happened in a certain way, while occurrence means something that
happened or came about in any way. Thus accident is a special type of
occurrence, but occurrence goes beyond such special confines and,
while including accident, it encompasses many other situations as well.
Id. at 184, 289 N.E.2d at 365 (quoting Aerial Agricultural Serv. of Montana, Inc.
v. Till, 207 F. Supp. 50, 57 (N.D. Miss. 1962)). This interpretation set the foun-
dation for the court's eventual conclusion that the term occurrence should not
be viewed in a sudden or momentary sense. See infra note 25.
The Grand River case was decided prior to the addition of the pollution ex-
clusion and sudden and accidental exception provisions in CGL policies. Had
the case been heard after these provisions had been accepted, the fact that
Grand River's operations produced emissions over a seven-year period may
have precluded insurance coverage. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying
text.
24. Id. at 185, 289 N.E.2d at 365.
25. Id. The appellate court concluded the interpretation of the term occur-
rence as extending over a period of time best comported with the phrase "in-
cluding injurious exposure to conditions" contained in the policy. Id. The court
also took note of a policy provision which read "all bodily injury and property
6
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coverage for the insured who fully intended the release of pollu-
tants, but neither expected nor intended the damage resulting
from the polluting event. 26
In light of such judicial interpretation, and the growing
awareness of potential environmental disasters (such as the Torrey
Canyon and Santa Barbara oil rig disasters and their resulting in-
demnification costs), insurers sought to impose more restrictive
parameters upon their CGL policies. The result of this re-evalua-
tion was the "pollution exclusion" clause which has become a
standard provision of insurance policies since 1973.27
The pollution exclusion clause is a two part policy provision
comprised of the exclusionary language and a brief, undefined ex-
ception. In total, the clause generally reads as follows:
This policy does not apply.., to bodily injury or prop-
erty damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, re-
lease, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials
or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or
upon the land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or
body of water; but this exclusion shall not apply if such dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.28
In drafting the exclusion language, the Mutual Insurance Rating
Bureau (the Bureau) attempted to close the interpretive "loop-
hole" in occurrence based coverage.
In addition to the inclusion of the pollution exclusion clause
by the Bureau in 1973,29 other revisions to the CGL policy were
damage arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence." Id.
26. Grand River, 32 Ohio App. 2d at 185, 289 N.E.2d at 365. The Grand
River decision illustrates how the insurance industry increased it's potential fi-
nancial burden as it eliminated the requirement that a polluting occurrence es-
tablishing coverage obligations be either sudden or temporal in nature. Tyler &
Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in Application Under the Comprehensive
General Liability Policy, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 497, 503 (1981). Although insurers an-
ticipated rectifying this development with the pollution exclusion clause, some
courts continued to ignore the absence of sudden or temporal elements in pol-
luting events when assessing insurer liability. See infra notes 59 & 71 and accom-
panying text.
27. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 26, at 500. The language of the pollution
exclusion clause was initially proposed in 1970 as a mandatory endorsement to
the Comprehensive General Liability Policy but was not incorporated as a policy
provision until 1973. Id. (citing DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GENERAL LIABIL-
ITY INSURANCE, 1973 REVISIONS, No. 1 (1974)).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. See supra note 27.
3791991]
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made as well. Specifically, the Bureau revised the definition of an
"occurrence" to read as follows: "[A]n accident, including contin-
uous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured."3 0 Occurrence based policies were not
intended to provide coverage for polluting or contaminating
events in most cases. According to the Bureau, this was due to
the fact that in most cases, the resulting damage would be ex-
pected or intended, and thus excluded by the definition of occur-
rence.3' However, courts frequently found that the resulting
damage was indeed unexpected from the insureds point of view.32
The pollution exclusion clause supposedly clarified the limits of
policy coverage "so as to avoid any questions of intent." 33 Cover-
age for damages or injuries arising from polluting or contaminat-
ing events was to be limited to accidents, thereby eliminating
coverage where the damaging event appeared to be expected or
intended on the part of the insured.3 4 Despite the industry's at-
tempt at clarifying the limits of CGL policy coverage, courts still
struggle with the construction of such policies.
III. THE DEFINITIONAL DISPUTE
A. Reconciling the Exclusion, Exception, and Definition
The root of the judicial quagmire involving CGL policies and
the pollution exclusion clause is a problem of semantics. Key
parts of the policy and the pollution exclusion clause raise inter-
pretive issues which courts have settled in a variety of ways.3 5
Ironically, it is from the attempts at clarification that many of the
interpretive problems arise.
30. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or Property Dam-
age Under the Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy,
19 FORUM 513 (1983) (citing Fish, An Overview of the 1973 Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance Policy and Products Liability Coverage, 34 J. Mo. B. 257, 258
(1978); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 101 (Vt. 1979)).
31. Joest, Will Insurance Companies Clean the Augean Stables-Insurance Coverage
for the Landfill Operator, 50 INs. COUNS. J. 258, 259 (1983). No explanation was
proffered by the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau for the basis of this
presumption.
32. See generally, Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 32 Ohio
App. 2d 178, 289 N.E.2d 360 (1972); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros.
Constr. & Timber Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145 (D. Or. 1966).
33. Joest, supra note 31, at 259 (quoting the Mutual Insurance Rating
Bureau).
34. Id. (quoting 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE App. 68
(1976)).
35. For example, see cases cited infra notes 59, 65, 71, 79 & 120.
8
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The occurrence definition extends coverage for accidents in-
volving "continuous or repeated exposure to conditions."
3 6
However, the pollution exclusion clause and exception only pro-
vide coverage when polluting events are "sudden and acciden-
tal." These policy provisions seem to beg a critical question
which has been the source of considerable litigation: can a pollut-
ing event which is continuous or repeated over time (i.e. a cov-
ered "accident" under the definition of occurrence) also be a
"sudden and accidental" event under the exception?3 7 Inher-
ently, a contradiction appears to exist between the policy defini-
tion of occurrence and the exclusion due to the use of the
"accident" concept in both the definition and the exclusion.
1. The Insurance Industry Interpretation
From the industry's standpoint in writing the exclusion and
exception, liability coverage was to be excluded for "willful, in-
tentional or expected" polluting violations.38 As understood in
the context of the policy, and from the insurers' point of view, an
occurrence that is covered includes an accident which is an event
that results in injury or damage "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured."3 9 The exclusion clause ex-
cludes polluting occurrences, but excepts from exclusion (i.e.
covers) polluting occurrences that are sudden and accidental. The
issue then is whether accidental in this context means the same as
accidental in "occurrence." The argument posited by the insur-
ance industry in response to this issue is that where the insured
intends to perform the activity which causes the damage, and pol-
lution is a known by-product of such activity, the release of con-
taminants causing such damage cannot be said to be unexpected
or unintended. 40 Therefore, the event is not sudden and acciden-
tal and raises no duty of defense or indemnification. A review of
the judicial history of this issue, however, shows that the courts
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. See cases cited supra note 35.
38. Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 FORUM
762, 767 (1976). By using the word "intentional," the insurance industry did
not mean to limit exclusion from coverage to instances where the inception of
pollutants into the surrounding area was the deliberate objective of the insured.
The intent of the insured did not have to be criminal. The insured's actions
could be intentional although their consequences were not foreseeable. The na-
ture of the consequences of the insured's actions was the liability inhibiting fac-
tor. See generally Rynearson, supra note 30, at 517.
39. Grand River, 32 Ohio App. 2d at 184, 289 N.E.2d at 364.
40. Id.
1991]
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do not always agree with this analysis. Courts have concluded
that the requisite unexpectedness or unintentional character on
the part of the insured pertains to the resulting damage and not
to the activity which caused the damage. 4'
2. Court Interpretations
In answering the question of whether the pollution exclu-
sion, sudden and accidental exception, and occurrence definitions
are reconcilable, courts must struggle with the issue of ambiguity.
A strong argument for ambiguity exists when the exclusionary
and exception language is read against the policy definition of oc-
currence. The reasoning behind this argument was elucidated in
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies v. Ex-CeU-O Corp.42 The district
court summarization of policyholder arguments concluded that
because "sudden" is undefined in the policy, and "accident" is
defined in the occurrence definition which holds an occurrence to
be "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions," an inherent conflict exists in the policy language.43
The ambiguity is the result of the undefined exception being read
in relation to the occurrence definition.44 This inferred conflict
permits an interpretation which transposes the definition of acci-
dent from the occurrence language upon the sudden and acciden-
tal exception. The result is an argument that the exclusion
should be understood as follows: "This exclusion does not apply
if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and acci-
dental, including continuous or repeated exposure to
41. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d
603 (1980), a case stemming from damages sustained when a gasoline storage
tank, installed and maintained by the insured, leaked causing damage to nearby
property. The Supreme Court of New York opined that "[i]f there was no intent
to cause harm then any injury resulting from ordinary negligence is considered
to be accidental. The 'accident' is simply the undesigned event and the natural
and ordinary consequences of a negligent act are not precluded." Id. at 488,
426 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
42. 702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
43. Id. at 1323.
44. The conflict argument is apparent when "sudden" is juxtaposed against
the occurrence definition which refers to "continuous and repeated exposure."
The terms do not seem to be reconcilable as "continuous and repeated" does
not bear an inference of immediacy that would be found in the term "sudden."
Hence, a conflict exists when the sudden and accidental exception is defined in
relation to the occurrence definition because both the exception and the defini-
tion employ the word "accident."
The Ex-Cell-O court also stated that an argument of ambiguity existed which
found the sudden and accidental exception ambiguous simply because it was
undefined. Id. The court flatly rejected this argument stating that the absence
of a definition does not in and of itself establish ambiguity. Id.
10
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conditions." 45
The district court found this argument to be a misinterpreta-
tion of the policy as the term "accident" is not defined in the CGL
as "including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions."-46
This language is actually from the definition of occurrence. The
court concluded that to negate the possible inference from the
term "accident" of being limited to conditions of short duration,
the occurrence definition was written to include such repeated or
ongoing polluting instances. 47 Therefore, the connotation from
the term "accident" should not be ignored as the definition of
occurrence was written to have a different interpretation from the
term "accident".
The argument proffered by insureds as stated above also pro-
duces an untenable result from the point of view of the insurance
companies as it vitiates the limitations the insurance industry
sought to establish through the exclusion. Repeated polluting in-
cidents would still warrant coverage under the exception. When
the individual provisions are read as separate and distinct entities,
however, reconciling the apparent contradiction poses less of an
interpretive dilemma. This interpretation was the basis of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Star Fire Coal, Inc. .48 This case arose out of an un-
derlying suit initiated by a nearby resident of a coal tipple oper-
ated by the insured, who allegedly sustained personal bodily
injury and property damage due to emissions of coal dust from
the Star Fire operation.4 9 The coal dust was generated and dis-
charged as part of Star Fire's normal business operation and was
cited on a number of occasions by the Kentucky Division of Air
Pollution Control for fugitive dust emissions.50 Star Fire brought
suit against its insurer when USF&G refused to provide coverage
45. Id. The Ex-Cell-O court stated a number of courts had accepted this
understanding of the policy language. Id. (citing New Castle County v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-65 (D. Del. 1987); Jackson Twp.
Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 164-65,
451 A.2d 990, 994 (1982); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 488,
426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (1980)).
46. Id. at 1324.
47. Id.
48. 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988).
49. Id. at 32.
50. Id. The coal dust was emitted when crushed coal was dropped into a
pile from a conveyor belt. Star Fire had attempted to correct this emission,
through the use of water spray systems, but was unable to control the problem
on a consistent basis. Id.
1991] 383
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for the underlying damage and would not defend Star Fire in the
injunction suit brought by the residential plaintiff.
Star Fire argued the use of forms of the word "accident" in
both the occurrence definition and the exception to the pollution
exclusion clause created a "latent ambiguity" in the contract,
which as a matter of law, had to be construed in favor of the
insured.5'
The appellate court expressly rejected this argument, stating
the following: "We believe the 'occurrence' definition results
in.. .coverage for continuous or repeated exposure to conditions
causing damage in all cases except those involving pollution,
where coverage is limited to situations where the discharge was
'sudden and accidental.' "52 The Star Fire court read the provi-
sions as separate and distinct entities, refusing to find any ambi-
guity in the language. The court concluded that the contractual
language was "'clear and plain, something only a lawyer's inge-
nuity could make ambiguous.'"53
When the occurrence provisions of the CGL policy is inter-
posed upon the exclusion, the sudden and accidental exception
becomes convoluted and ineffective. If courts do not read the oc-
currence definition as a separate and distinct entity from the ex-
ception to the pollution exclusion clause, a sudden and accidental
release can easily become synonymous with unexpected and unin-
tended damage. Such a reading causes a shift in emphasis from
the nature of the release of pollutants to the nature of the dam-
ages caused by the release. Insureds have a considerably easier
burden of proof for purposes of the exception in showing that the
resulting damages were unexpected and unintended rather than
proving the same for the release pollutants into the environment.
Courts who accept the policyholder construction of the exception
will find allocating indemnification costs on the insurer
justifiable. 54
51. Id.
52. Star Fire, 856 F.2d at 34 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 34. (quoting American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp.,
667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987)).
54. See supra note 41 pertaining to Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co, 73
A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980); see also Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Jones-
ville Prods., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 156 Mich. App. 508, 402 N.W.2d
46 (1986); Jackson Twp. Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem., 186 N.J.
Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982).
The effect of such a construction of the term "sudden," has been noted by a
variety of courts, including the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which stated:
"Courts that have construed 'sudden' broadly, defining it in terms of the expec-
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B. Interpreting the Exclusion and Exception
It is apparent from the above discussion that the individual
policy provisions are quite capable, when read together, of gener-
ating judicially inconsistent opinions. Interpretation of the pollu-
tion exclusion clause by itself without reference to the occurrence
definition has been the source of considerable litigation. The
central issue of such litigation focuses on the undefined language
used to express the exception parameters. Quite simply, the
courts cannot agree on the definition of a "sudden and acciden-
tal" polluting event.
Black's Law Dictionary defines sudden as "happening with-
out previous notice or with very brief notice; coming or occurring
unexpectedly; unforeseen; unprepared for." 55 Black's defines ac-
cidental as "happening by chance, or unexpectedly; taking place
not according to usual course of things; casual; fortuitous." 56
Definitionally, and from common usage, the terms appear to
connote something occurring unexpectedly and momentarily;
that is, they appear to have temporal connotations. This was the
connotation the insurance industry intended to foster in drafting
the exclusion.57 However, courts have been reluctant to infer
such an intention in the absence of definitive contractual lan-
guage. Instead, some courts have read the language of the excep-
tion as being ambiguous because it is undefined in the policy. 5 8
1. Judicial Finding of Ambiguity
In New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 59 the
tation element of accident rather than focusing on its temporal significance, have
deemed polluting events excepted [from the exclusion] that otherwise appear to
fit squarely within the exclusion." Waste Management of the Carolinas, Inc. v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 699, 340 S.E.2d 374, 382 (1986). See also FL
Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988).
55. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1284 (5th ed. 1979).
56. Id. at 15.
57. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 673 F.Supp.
1359 (D. Del. 1987); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 668 F.Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987);Jackson Twp. Mun. Util. Auth. v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156,451 A.2d 990, (1982); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, (1980); Buckeye
Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App.3d 127, 477
N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
59. 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987). The case stems from a series of law-
suits brought as a result of a county landfill leaching contaminants into ground-
water used by both private individuals and a neighboring water company. The
water company's suit sought injunctive relief as well as reimbursement pursuant
1991] 385
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District Court of Delaware noted that the word sudden has a defi-
nition of "happening without previous notice" or "occurring un-
expectedly." 60  However, the court also indicated that other
definitions of the word give the connotation of brevity.6' As a
result, more than one reasonable definition existed and the court
found the term to be ambiguous. 62 Under Delaware law, insur-
ance policies are contracts of adhesion, and as such, are con-
strued strictly against the drafter in the event of ambiguity. 63
Therefore, the court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the in-
sured and held that Hartford had a duty to defend and indemnify
the County in the underlying cases.6
2. Judicial Interpretation of Temporal Meaning
In opposition to holdings such as those in New Castle County
are decisions which find the term "sudden and accidental" to
have a plain, everyday meaning that is not ambiguous. For exam-
ple, in FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,65 the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals construed the sudden and accidental
exception as entailing a temporal construction; therefore, Aetna
was not liable for indemnification costs resulting from claims
to section 107 of CERCLA for the cost of responding to the contamination. Id.
at 1361-62 (citing Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle, No. 83-854 (D. Del. 1983)).
Additionally, the United States sought injunctive relief and reimbursement of
response costs under section 107 of CERCLA and asserted county liability
under the RCRA. Id. at 1362 (citing United States v. New Castle County, No.
80-489 (D. Del. 1984)).
60. Id. at 1362-63 (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY at 22843 and BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)).
61. Id. at 1363.
62. Id. The court took notice of the case law supporting the county's con-
tention that the term is ambiguous (citing Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Fla. 1987) and Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980)), as well as the
case law supporting Hartford's contention that the term is unambiguous (citing
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 865 F.2d 1217 (11 th Cir. 1989)). How-
ever, the court concluded that none of the cases were binding and that because
such an authoritative split existed, the ambiguity could not be resolved by the
existing case law. Id. at 1363.
63. New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1362.
64. Id. at 1362-63 (citing Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443
A.2d 925 (Del. 1982)). The court stated that an ambiguity is created when the
contract terminology permits more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. As
the term "sudden" was susceptible to multiple connotations, it was ambiguous
and therefore had to be construed in favor of the insured. Id. at 1362. See gener-
ally Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1541 (D. Fla. 1987); Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 288 Pa. Super. 445, 432
A.2d 596 (1981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co. 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d
603 (1980).
65. 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990).
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against the insured's successor in interest for contamination of
surrounding property caused by the storage and removal of liqui-
fled industrial wastes. 66 In the court's analysis, the exception was
not found to be ambiguous; rather, the court decided the terms
"sudden" and "accidental" should be given their "plain, everyday
meaning" which entailed the temporal construction. 67 "When
the words are free from ambiguity the instrument is always to be
construed according the strict, plain, common meanings of the
words themselves." 68 A lay person would read the exclusionary
language to deny coverage of the insured because the facts did
not comport with the temporal construction inherent in the plain
meaning of the words sudden and accidental.
The fact that different courts can read the exact same policy
language and reach diametrically opposite conclusions seems to
suggest that the pollution exclusion clause is at best, tenuously
reliable in its application as a modification of CGL policies.
When read as unambiguous separate and distinct provisions
of CGLs, the occurrence definition is compatible with the pollu-
tion exclusion clause and its exception. Insurance companies
could have been spared the ambiguity argument altogether had
the Bureau specifically defined the exception in its 1973 revi-
sion.69 Considering the impact any language which broadens the
scope of indemnification responsibility has on the policy (not to
mention on the insurance companies), the language should have
been explicitly drafted so as to clearly state the intentions of the
drafter.
66. Id. at 216.
67. Id. at 219. The appeals court cited the dictionary definition of sudden,
defining it as "happening, coming, made or done quickly, without warning or
unexpectedly; abrupt" Id. (quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1209
(1970)). The court also cited the definition of accidental, as "happening by
chance; unintentional or fortuitous." Id. (quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTION-
ARY 8 (1970)). The court stated,"[t]hese definitions comport with the common
understanding of the terms as they are used in everyday parlance." Id. The
court reasoned that in everyday parlance, the term sudden had a temporal com-
ponent which barred the insured from claiming that the contamination which
resulted from the long term storage of liquefied industrial wastes was sudden
and accidental. Id. at 219-20.
68. Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).
69. For a review of a model defined exception, see infra notes 129-32 and
accompanying text.
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IV. ANCILLARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Release Versus Damages
The language of the CGLs has raised related issues regarding
the means by which a pollutant enters an area and causes contam-
ination. Some courts focus on whether the pollutants which
caused the contamination entered the environment unexpectedly,
while others focus on whether the resulting damage could be ex-
pected as a result of the insured's activity or whether the insured
regularly disposed of hazardous contaminants. Those courts
which focus on the former consideration use an analysis similar to
that in Grand River, which predated the widespread inception of
the pollution exclusion clause. 70 This analysis was adopted by the
United States District for the Southern District of Florida in Pep-
per's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ,71 a
case arising from claims made against the insured by the EPA in
response to PCB 72 contamination around Pepper's property. 73
The court interpreted the sudden and accidental exception of the
exclusion clause to include the situation where the release of
PCBs into an aquifer was neither intended nor expected from the
insured's point of view.74 Absent a showing of knowledge or ex-
pectation of damage, the insured cannot be deemed to be an "ac-
tive" polluter, or one who purposely or knowingly pollutes the
environment. 75 To purposely or knowingly pollute connotes an
inference of intent upon the insured. The interpretation of intent
for courts adopting Pepper's reasoning for assessment of liability is
limited to the consequences of the insured's actions. Intent to do
harm would be a prerequisite for withholding coverage. Uninten-
tional consequences of deliberate insured actions would retain
coverage. 76 Therefore, the insured still falls under the purview
of the sudden and accidental exception. 77
70. For a discussion of the Grand River analysis, see supra note 22 and ac-
companying text. The fact that judicial emphasis has often continued to fall on
whether the pollutants entered the environment unexpectedly (thereby causing
unexpected damage) rather than on the activity of the insured as contemplated
by the industry (see supra text accompanying note 41) suggests that the pollution
exclusion clause has not provided sufficient clarification of the industry's intent.
71. 668 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
72. PCB is the abbreviation for polychlorinated biphenyls.
73. Pepper's Steel, 668 F. Supp. at 1543.
74. Id. at 1549.
75. Id. at 1550.
76. See generally Rynearson, supra note 30 at 517-18.
77. The Pepper's court factually concluded that the insured did not know it
was releasing PCB's into the environment. Pepper's Steel, 668 F. Supp. at 1549.
16
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The Pepper's court made a distinction between intent to re-
lease pollutants and intent to pollute. 78 Such a distinction on the
nature of the intent was considered irrelevant by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in Waste Management of the Carolinas, Inc. v.
Peerless Insurance Co..79 The case originated from claims alleging
the contamination of well water from the leaching of waste mater-
ials disposed of in a landfill operated by Waste Industries. s0
The Waste Management court held that the focus of the pollu-
tion exclusion was not concerned with expectation or intention as
was the case with the occurrence language of the policy. 8'
However, its opinion says nothing concerning the fact that the insured had been
cited by the EPA for the same violation six years earlier. Id. at 1543. By ignor-
ing this fact, the court leaves unanswered a compelling issue which may have
caused doubt in Pepper's contention that it was unaware that it was releasing
PCB's into the environment. A second question of fact was created which re-
quired consideration: Once you know you have caused a polluting occurrence
and you take remedial action, are you liable when that remedial action fails?
Other courts have concluded that recurring polluting events are sufficient to
place the insured on notice that the potential for such contamination exists, and
therefore these events do not come under the sudden and accidental exception
to the pollution exclusion clause in the future. See infra note 98 and accompany-
ing text.
78. Id. at 1549.
79. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
80. Id. at 689, 340 S.E.2d at 376. When the United States filed suit against
Waste Industries, it responded by filing third party complaints against Trash
Removal Services, Inc. (TRS) seeking indemnification or contribution, as TRS
had delivered quantities of the contaminating wastes to the landfill. TRS subse-
quently requested defense of the suit from its insurers, including Peerless.
When the insurer denied a duty to defend or indemnify, this suit commenced.
Id. at 690, 340 S.E.2d at 376.
It is interesting to note the Waste Management court's factual findings con-
cerning the issue of ambiguity. According to the court's review of the policy
language and facts at issue, the actions of the insured did not fall under the clear
and unambiguous construction of the sudden and accidental exception to the
exclusion. (The court employed the "comparison test" to determine if TRS's
liability insurance provisions would require coverage when compared against
the events being alleged. In the comparison test, pleadings are read side-by-side
with the policy to ascertain if the alleged events are covered or excluded by the
policy provisions. Id. at 693, 340 S.E.2d at 378.) The court concluded that the
non-technical language of the exclusion should be read in light of the meanings
the words receive in ordinary speech, and though the possibility exists to find
ambiguity in the policy language, "it strains at logic to do so." Id. at 695, 340
S.E.2d at 379.
81. Id. at 696, 340 S.E.2d at 380-81. In a footnote, however, the court
noted that according to R. LONG, supra note 34, at 58, the exclusion eliminated
coverage for damage which appeared to be expected or intended on the part of
the insured and therefore is excluded under the occurrence definition. The ref-
erence back to the occurrence language is the cause of misinterpretation for
many courts which see the exclusion and exception as nothing more than a re-
statement of the occurrence provision of the policy. Waste Management, 315 N.C.
at 696, 340 S.E.2d at 380. Rather than focusing on the nature of the damage,
these courts focus on the accidental nature of the cause of the damage. In sup-
1991] 389
17
Gaudioso: A Matter of Interpretation: The Judicial Quagmire concerning the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
390 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II: p. 373
Rather, the focus of the exclusion was said to center more on the
nature of the damages; that is, the fact that the discharge pollutes
or contaminates. Only the sudden and accidental exception to
the exclusion is concerned with the moment of release or disper-
sal.8 2 Courts that interpret the exclusion in reference to the re-
lease itself rather than in relation to the fact that the release
pollutes or contaminates find it easy to bootstrap the sudden and
accidental exception onto any situation where a gradual release of
pollutants was not specifically alleged.8 3 The court cited as an
example the case of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dingwell84 where just
such an outcome was reached.8 5 The Dingwell court found that
the sudden and accidental exception may apply where an in-
sured's negligence permitted wastes to seep into the ground over
time and contaminate well water.8 6 The court held that it was the
release from the Dingwell facility, rather than the seepage or
damage, that was the polluting occurrence. 87 Since, according to
the insured, the release of pollutants was sudden, the Dingwell
court found that the "behavior of the pollutants in the environ-
port of this contention, the court refers to an opinion inJackson Twp. Mun. Util.
Auth. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 164, 451 A.2d 990, 994
(1982), which held that "the clause can be interpreted as simply a restatement of
the definition of 'occurrence'-that is, that the policy will cover claims where the
injury was neither expected nor intended." Waste Management, 315 N.C. at 697,
340 S.E.2d at 380.
82. Waste Management, 315 N.C. at 697, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
83. Id. The court inferred a temporal interpretation of the sudden and acci-
dental exception, evidenced by its conclusion that the exclusion "limits the in-
surer's liability for accidental events by excluding damage caused by the gradual
release, escape, discharge, or dispersal of irritants, contaminants or pollutants."
Id. Such an interpretation of the exception would effectively bar a considerable
number of suits where damage was caused by gradual contamination such as in
Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989)
(insurer had duty to defend where insured's dump site caused personal injury
and property damage due to pollutant emission over time as insured did not
intentionally or knowingly pollute surrounding area), reh 'g denied, 894 F.2d 498
(2d Cir. 1990) and Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980)
(appellate court found that where insured's negligence allowed contaminants to
permeate ground and contaminate well water over time, releases could have
been unexpected or unintended and therefore, outside of exclusion). By focus-
ing on the damage rather than the accidental nature of the occurrence insureds
would have less incentive to remain ignorant about the potential for contamina-
tion and therefore, would be forced to increase their vigilance so as to avoid
potential polluting occurrences, which would be excluded from coverage. In
this way, the public policy inherent in the exclusion would be enforced.
84. 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980).
85. Waste Management, 315 N.C. at 697, 340 S.E.2d at 381 (citing Dingwell,
414 A.2d at 225).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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ment after release [to be] irrelevant." 88 The Waste Management
court, not surprisingly, considered this construction of the exclu-
sion "to be so restrictive as to vitiate the 'sudden and accidental'
exception." 8 9
Such a construction as posited by the Dingwell court would
also contravene the public policy goal of the pollution exclusion
clause as it would encourage insureds to remain ignorant of the
potential dangers posed by the wastes in their landfills. Coverage
would still be afforded to the insured who intentionally dumps
hazardous wastes as long as the resulting contamination was
unexpected. 90 When the public policy is ignored, the likelihood
that insureds will continue to pollute increases as the economic
incentive to do so greatly exceeds the incentive to enact correc-
tive or preventative measures to guard against polluting the
environment.
B. The Problem of Ongoing Polluting Occurrences
The second ancillary issue centers on the question of
whether a polluting event can be continuous or repeated and still
be considered sudden by the insurer. The issue was the focal
point of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grant-Southern Iron
& Metal Co. v. CNA Insurance Co..9 1 The facts of the underlying
case against Grant-Southern alleged that the company's iron bri-
quetting plant emitted various pollutants "regularly and continu-
ously" causing both personal injury and property damage.9 2
The district court granted summary judgment for CNA on
88. Id. (emphasis in original).
89. Id. The interpretive difference between the Waste Management and
Dingwell holdings is essentially one of timing. Under the Waste Management ap-
proach, the moment of release occurs when the contaminant permeates the envi-
ronment and, for example, seeps into an aquifer; under the Dingwell analysis,
release occurs when the pollutant actually leaves the controlled enclosure which
held the substance. Ultimately, though the Waste Management court concluded
that leaching of pollutants cannot be covered by the sudden and accidental ex-
ception, the wording of the pleadings determined the decision of the court. The
court found no specific or implied allegation concerning the sudden release or
escape of contaminants in the pleadings or deposition, and therefore concluded
that the alleged occurrences fell outside the policy coverage. Id. at 700, 340
S.E.2d at 383.
90. Id. at 697-98, 340 S.E.2d at 381. The court stated that in such cases, "it
pays the insured to keep his head in the sand," because he would not be held
liable for the contamination which would be "sudden" from his point of view.
Id. at 698, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
91. 905 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1990), revu 669 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
92. Id. at 955. The company had received no less than thirty-four violation
notices between 1959 and 1981. Id. at 958.
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the basis that Grant-Southern had received numerous violation
notices concerning the emissions, and, therefore, it was guilty of
continuous and ongoing pollution which could not have been
"accidental". 93 The appeals court reversed the decision of the
district court, observing that some of the Grant-Southern viola-
tions were stamped with the word "complied" or noted remedial
steps taken to correct the violations. 94 The court stated that such
facts suggested isolated or discrete polluting events that would
fall under the purview of the exception. 95 However, several of the
violations were dated within close chronological proximity of
each other, which suggested ongoing or continuous polluting
which would not be coverable under the exclusion. 96 Therefore,
the court found a "genuine issue of fact" to exist as to whether
the occurrences were, indeed, sudden and accidental which was
sufficient to reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment.97
Consideration of the sudden and accidental language in rela-
tion to "isolated and discrete" occurrences could potentially
weaken the effectiveness of the exclusion if it is used to broaden
the purview of the exception. Polluting events do not necessarily
have to be continuous, ongoing, or even predictable to be ex-
pected, particularly when the occurrence is considered in light of
the insured's normal business operation. An insured may not be
aware that its activities will cause a certain type of damage, but it
should be on notice once it has caused a polluting occurrence.
Polluting occurrences that happen repeatedly for the same rea-
sons are difficult to justify as "accidents". This was the finding of
the court of appeals in Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Insurance
Group,98 a case stemming from an underlying suit against the in-
sured alleging that the emissions from Barmet's operations
93. Id. at 956.
94. Id. at 958.
95. Grant-Southern, 905 F.2d at 958.
96. Id.
97. Id. In granting summary judgment, the district court found the public
policy argument of prohibiting industries from seeking insurance coverage
rather than stop polluting the environment persuasive in its decision to grant
partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance company. Grant
Southern, 669 F. Supp. 798 at 800-01. The court stated that "insurance compa-
nies did not undertake to indemnify Grant-Southern against events which were
within its control and the occurrence of which was known to the insured." Id. at
801. In reaching such a conclusion, the Grant-Southern court relied on the New
York supreme court, appellate division decision in Niagara County v. Utica Mut.
Ins. Co., infra note 120 and accompanying text.
98. 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. App. 1981).
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caused a fog which reduced visibility on a nearby highway. As a
result of the decreased visibility, an automobile accident occurred
which killed a motorist.99 Barmet's aluminum recycling operation
had caused gaseous emissions on a number of occasions due to
malfunctions in the plant's pollution control system. Barmet ar-
gued that the ensuing damage (the death of the automobile
driver) was neither expected nor intended as the emissions were
unforeseeable and unpredictable. 00 The court found this argu-
ment unpersuasive, as Barmet was aware that it's operation often
produced the emissions and had, in fact, received numerous com-
plaints as a result of these emissions.' 0 ' Therefore, the court
found that the discharge could not be sudden and accidental
within the meaning of the policy.' 0 2
The court conceded the fact that Barmet may not have in-
tended for the emissions to obstruct visibility and lead to the acci-
dent. 03 However, the insured was fully cognizant of the fact that
its pollution control system occasionally malfunctioned 0 4 and
produced emissions. Therefore, it concluded that "Barmet may
have been unable to predict the exact time when the emissions
would be discharged, but they certainly knew the emissions would
continue as a part of their business operations."'' 0 5 For this
reason, the accident could not be held to be unexpected or
unforeseeable. ' 0 6
Without directly addressing the public policy interest inher-
ent in the exclusion, the Barmet court alluded to the goal of plac-
99. Id. at 202.
100. Id. at 202-03. Barmet stated that there was no mechanism or proce-
dure by which it could accurately predict when the emissions would escape. Id.
at 202.
101. Id. at 203.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 203.
104. Testimony at trial revealed that the emissions occurred anywhere from
occasionally to once or twice a week. Id. at 202.
105. Id. at 203. Similarly, in City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
604 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979), the court agreed with an insurer that where an
insured city had reason to expect that raw sewage which had backed up into
residential housing on six occasions due to a shutdown of a city-run pump,
would do so again, the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify. The court
stated that to interpret the word "accident" is to look at the question of whether
a result is "expected as a matter of probability." Reasonable foreseeability is not
a factor in this type of analysis. Rather, from an examination of the totality of
circumstances, if the insured knew or should have known there was a substantial
probability that pollution or contamination would occur as a result of his acts or
omissions, then no accident or occurrence has taken place as defined in the pol-
icy. Id. at 1058-59.
106. Barmet, 425 N.E.2d at 203.
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ing the liability for polluting events on the party most able to
control their occurrence.' 0 7 The court stated Barmet was aware
of the incidence of emissions coming from their plant and, there-
fore, had the opportunity to correct the situation.' 0 8 This infer-
ence is similar to the public policy argument put forth by the
Waste Management court which stated that relegating the economic
liability for polluting events occurring over time upon the insured
"places the responsibility to guard against such occurrences upon
the party with the most control over the circumstances most likely
to cause the pollution."' 0 9
V. A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE DISPUTE: THE
UNDERLYING RATIONALES
A variety of explanations have been proffered to explain the
inclination of some courts to interpret the provisions of the
CGL policies so strictly against the insurance companies, de-
spite the pollution exclusion language. These range from expla-
nations which border on alleging judicial caprice" t0 to the opin-
ion that the sudden and accidental terminology is inherently
ambiguous." ' I
A further argument put forth suggests that courts have ig-
nored the underlying public policy 1 2 inherent in the pollution
exclusion clause in favor of adherence to provisions of contract
construction which evolved in the interpretation of such non-
business related concerns as automobile insurance policies."
3
107. The court found that Barmet was aware that its pollution control sys-
tem failed on a regular basis. Id. Therefore, the responsibility for any polluting
events occurring as a result of this repeated failure would logically fall on the
party most able to control the situation-the insured.
108. Id.
109. Waste Management, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
110. An interesting footnote from a Georgetown Law Journal Note elo-
quently gave a potential explanation of why courts have often ignored or dis-
torted the insurer's intent in drafting the sudden and accidental terminology.
Favoritism toward the insured comports with the following general proposition:
"[C]ourts really hate polluters but they hate insurers even more." Note, The
Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L. J. 1237, 1240
(1986).
111. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also Pepper's Steel & Al-
loys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Fla. 1987);
Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 218 N.J.
Super. 516, 528 A.2d 76 (1987); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d
486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980).
112. For an explanation of the public policy considerations in the pollution
exclusion clause, see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
113. Adler & Broiles, The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social Policy of
22
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When interpreting the CGL within the ambit of standard contrac-
tual maxims, the courts fail to recognize the difference in effect
judicial interpretation has on business decisions as opposed to
matters which are not business related. Therefore, when courts
interpret CGLs with environmental implications in the same way
they would interpret an automobile insurance policy, they ignore
the fact that judicial interpretation of an automobile insurance
policy will generally not effect automobile usage; conversely, judi-
cial interpretation of matters relating to business will often affect
corporate decision-making." , 4 The inference is clear: by apply-
ing a strict contractual reading of the pollution exclusion clause,
as would be appropriate in non-business related matters such as
automobile insurance policies, the courts have failed to challenge
corporate decision-makers who may find that it is more cost effec-
tive to rely on insurance indemnification for polluting events
rather than bear the expense of responsibility for contaminating
the environment or implementing preventative or corrective
measures.
Perhaps the most short-sighted explanation of why courts
have construed the exclusion clause so liberally in favor of in-
sureds is a "deep pocket" scapegoat approach whereby courts
have found a convenient source of cleanup funds in the insurance
carriers.' 1 5 According to this explanation, the disincentive to pol-
lute, which is the inferred focus of the pollution exclusion clause,
has been ignored by courts in need of a "deep pocket" to finance
environmental cleanup." 16 In the typical scenarios involving such
an explanation, the operator of a landfill and/or the operator's
assets have disappeared, or the insured either does not have suffi-
cient assets, or the insured is in bankruptcy and, therefore, cannot
cover the cost of cleanup. In light of often-limited state or federal
cleanup resources, insurance carriers provide a convenient source
Preventing Pollution Through the Insurance Policy, 19 LOYOLA L. R. 1251, 1261
(1986).
114. Id. at 1262. Adler and Broiles argue that in failing to distinguish the
inherent differences between the interpretation of business related and non-
business related insurance policies, the courts have ignored the business sophis-
tication of the insureds in dealing with the pollution exclusion issue. Id. The
social policy relevance of the pollution exclusion is not addressed because the
issue "has been obscured by judicial platitudes such as a 'contract of insurance
prepared and phrased by the insurer is to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer.' " Id. at 1261 (quoting Buckeye Union
Ins. v. Liberty Solvent & Chem. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984)).
115. Id. at 1261.
116. Id.
1991]
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of funds to finance cleanup costs. 1 7 The justification courts have
employed for the assessment of indemnification costs on the in-
surers is by "finding some 'doubt' or 'ambiguity' in the [pollution
exclusion] clause which must be resolved in favor of the
insured." I I"
An often cited reason for refusing to impute liability for an
insured's polluting event upon the insurance companies has been
the public policy consideration. Many courts have adopted an ac-
tivist approach in effectually concluding that the best way to re-
duce the number of polluting incidents is by forcing polluters to
assume financial responsibility for their contaminating events."l 9
For example, in Niagara County v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. ,120 a
case originating from claims against Niagara County, New York,
involving the infamous Love Canal site, the court was adamant
about enforcing the underlying public policy inherent in the ex-
clusion.' 2 ' Under New York law, the pollution exclusion clause is
required to be included in insurance policies so as to avoid the
potential for commercial enterprises to hide behind insurance in-
demnification rather than stop polluting the environment. 22 "A
polluting corporation might continue to pollute the environment
if it could buy protection from potential liability for only the small
cost of an annual insurance premium, whereas, it might stop pol-
117. Joest, supra note 31, at 261.
118. Adler & Broiles, supra note 113, at 1261 (footnote omitted). The re-
sult of assessing damages to the "deep pocket" is a tenuous short-term solution.
There are instances when insurance indemnification is a proper source of
cleanup funds. However, if courts continue to "draw from the well" without
regard for the liability parameters established in the pollution exclusion clause,
the availability of future cleanup funds could be adversely affected. The re-
sponse of the insurance industry to increased liability costs from the use of oc-
currence based policies was the attempt to restrict the parameters of coverage in
the pollution exclusion clause. Insurance companies will undoubtedly be forced
to respond to increased liability costs despite the pollution exclusion if courts
continue to seek a deep pocket solution. Such a response may be in the form of
higher premiums (which could price many businesses which require such insur-
ance out of existence) or a flat refusal to provide coverage for potential environ-
mental polluters. See generally, Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 6, at 21.
119. See e.g., Waste Management, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
120. 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981).
121. Id. at 540. The "Love Canal" litigation stemmed from complaints on
behalf of some sixty-five claimants which alleged that various defendants reck-
lessly dumped and abandoned waste products, debris, and chemicals which
were, or eventually became, poisonous and inherently dangerous. Id. The con-
taminated property was subsequently sold to the plaintiffs (or their predecessors
in title) for residential use without notification of the dangerous condition ex-
isting on the land. Id. at 416, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
122. Id. at 418, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 540 (the exclusion is statutorily mandated
under "Insurance Law, § 46, subds. 13, 14").
24
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luting, if it has to risk bearing itself the full penalty for violating
the law." ' 23
If the public policy inherent in the exclusion is considered by
a court interpreting the pollution exclusion clause, the potential
to read ambiguity into the exception may be decreased. When
one considers that the underlying goal of the exclusion is to force
economic responsibility upon the polluting insureds (so as to re-
duce the incidence of polluting occurrences), the argument that
the exception is ambiguous seems less compelling. As used in
ordinary speech, the temporal component of the terms is evident
and unambiguous. 24
123. Id. (citing N.Y. Legis. Ann. 1971, 353-54). The court expressed the
public policy inherent in the exclusion in clear and uncompromising language,
but still arrived at the conclusion that Utica Mutual did have a duty to defend
Niagara County in the underlying Love Canal litigation. The court stated that
there was no serious contention that Niagara County actually took part in any
polluting. The complaints in reference to the county alleged that Niagara
County had, among other things, failed to warn and safeguard its citizens, re-
move the contaminants, and had wrongly conveyed property in the area without
warning about its dangers. Id. at 420, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 541. However, such alle-
gations fall outside of the purview of the pollution exclusion clause. Utica Mu-
tual had failed to show a nexus between the allegations of the complaint and the
exclusionary language. Id. at 420, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 542. Rather, the basis of
Utica Mutual's defense was that there was no language in either the New York
statute or the pollution exclusion which limited the exclusion to acts by the in-
sured. Id. at 419, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41. The court found this to be irrelevant,
as "to hold otherwise would require that we disregard the unqualified public
policy intendment of the statute to prohibit polluters from spreading the risk of
loss through the instrument of liability insurance." Id. at 419, 439 N.Y.S.2d at
541.
Factually, the Utica Mutual case poses a unique situation not clarified by the
exclusion. Niagara County is a governmental entity which did not actually han-
dle the contaminating wastes. The exclusion does not differentiate between the
owners of the land and the operators of the waste sites. The county, as an in-
sured, has coverage for its acts and in this situation, can argue that it did not act
with respect to the placement of pollutants in the environment.
The court's dismissal of Utica Mutual's argument, however, could pose a
potential dilemma in other similar scenarios. While it is true that Niagara
County was not "actively" involved in the disposal of the contaminants, it was
aware of their presence and the potential for injury or damage. Despite this
knowledge, the court focused on the active or actual act of polluting in deciding
on whether the exclusion was applicable. Such reasoning would necessarily per-
mit the owner of land renting to a landfill operator to be indemnified for con-
tamination which resulted from the leaching of wastes as long as he was not
physically involved in the dumping of the pollutants. Potentially, those who
merely have hazardous wastes stored on their property could be safe from the
pollution exclusion clause under this scenario. Id. at 418-19, 439 N.Y.S.2d at
541; see also Note, supra note 110, at 1271.
124. See generally cases cited in supra notes 48, 65 & 79.
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VI. EXITING THE QUAGMIRE?
A. A More Adequately Defined Exception Clause
A myriad of issues pertaining to the exclusion exist irrespec-
tive of the apparent contradiction between the occurrence lan-
guage and the sudden and accidental exception. Interpretive
differences focusing on the exception, public policy considera-
tions, and contractual constructions provide ample fodder for ju-
dicial deliberation of the liability expectations of both insurers
and insureds arising from CGL policies. The apparent contradic-
tion in the contract language, however, presents the critical issue
for resolution. The issue could have been avoided by including a
defined sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclu-
sion clause. In its current form, some courts have defined the
sudden and accidental exception based on the language found in
the occurrence definition.125 If the exception was defined accord-
ing to the terms which the insurance industry intended it to be
understood, the ability to convolute the limitations of coverage
would be removed. 126
A possible defined exception, proceeding from the original
pollution exclusion language, 127 could read as follows:
[B]ut this exclusion shall not apply if the discharge, dis-
persal, release, or escape is caused by a sudden and acci-
dental event. Sudden and accidental events do not
include wilful, negligent, or reckless acts or omissions of
the insured. These wilful, negligent, or reckless acts or
omissions include, but are not limited to, failure to prop-
erly inspect, replace, repair, maintain, or employ equip-
ment and facilities so as to conform with applicable state
and federal laws and regulations governing the handling,
storage, transportation, dispersal, or release of waste
materials.
Such a definition would provide coverage when the polluting re-
lease itself was caused by a sudden and accidental event. This
considers the temporal component inherent in the insurance in-
dustry's interpretive argument. Coverage would be omitted,
however, where a polluting release was precipitated by the in-
125. See generally cases cited supra note 45.
126. For a reading of this understanding, see supra note 52 and accompany-
ing text.
127. For the pollution exclusion language, see supra note 28 and accompa-
nying text.
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sured's own negligence or failure to properly correct a defective
condition in his machinery or his failure to properly maintain
waste storage facilities. 128
Compliance with legislative standards on the handling of haz-
ardous wastes imposes an obligation on the insured to actively
maintain waste storage or producing facilities and equipment.
When the machinery or facilities employed to store or transport
wastes are incapable of being used reliably, the legislative stan-
dards cannot be met. When an insured fails to diligently maintain
equipment or facilities, a polluting event which occurs as a result
of the use of those items cannot be said to be sudden and
accidental. ' 29
B. Overcoming The Ramifications of Liability Assessment
The split among jurisdictions as to the interpretive construc-
tion of the sudden and accidental exception to the pollution ex-
clusion clause in relation to the coverage provisions of CGL
policies is just one manifestation of the environmental cleanup
problem. The true genesis of the problem is the fact that in prior
periods, neither insurers nor insureds considered the issue as par-
ticularly pressing. Prior to the enactment of environmental legis-
lation in the 1970's and 80's, which raised both public awareness
of the problem and polluter responsibility standards, there were
few, if any definitive laws regarding pollution or polluting viola-
tions.' 30 Environmentally related liabilities assessed to insureds
today were often not considered "pollution" according to any
legislative standard at the time when the wastes were generated
or disposed of by plant operators. In the advent of CERCLA
legislation mandating a "Superfund" to finance environmental
128. The use of this definitional language would clarify the reasoning em-
ployed in such cases as Barmet. See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the case. Repeated polluting occurrences, indicative of an in-
sured's knowledge of equipment or facility defect, would not warrant coverage
as the operator would be on notice of the probability of subsequent polluting
events.
The temporal understanding of the word "accident," so important in such
cases as FL Aerospace (see supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the case), would also be clearly recognizable. An insured who, through wilful
neglect, allows the deterioration of his pollution storage, transportation, or han-
dling assets, would be unable to claim that the eventual release of contaminants
(precipitated by his negligence) was sudden and accidental as the moment of
release would not be the controlling factor in assessing liability. The sudden
and accidental nature of the occurrence precipitating the release would be the
primary consideration for liability assessment.
129. See supra note 128.
130. Greenberg, supra note 7, at 26.
1991] 399
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clean-up, and supplemental legislation such as the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 131 an im-
mediate onus was placed on polluters to come up with funds to
pay the cost of repairing the damage they had caused to the envi-
ronment. Estimates as to the cost of cleaning up the sites requir-
ing correction generally range from 150 to 700 billion dollars.' 3 2
Part of the problem from the insurers' point of view is that
insurance premiums are set based on past experience, not future
speculation. Insurers turn profits when premiums exceed the
value of the risk assessed to each policyholder. 3 3 When
Superfund liabilities were placed upon the insurers through in-
demnification for policies written prior to CERCLA's enactment,
insurance companies had no reserves set aside for such ex-
penses. 34 In effect, the actual value of risk assessed upon in-
sureds and the costs incurred by insurers exceeded premium
revenues.
Insurers and insureds, therefore, face a dilemma. Obviously,
insurers will not continue to issue policies which generate losses.
Carriers cannot simply raise premium rates to cover the estimated
costs of future environmental cleanup as both competitive reali-
ties and insurance rate regulatory statutes prohibit such ac-
tions.' 35 Insureds cannot be expected to make up for past
shortfalls resulting from the miscalculations of the industry and
carriers cannot seek retroactive reimbursement for actual risk val-
ues which have exceeded premium revenues due to Superfund
and litigation requirements. 136 The ultimate question resulting
from the problem of environmental cleanup remains: who pays?
In the short term, that question will continue to be answered
by divided courts which cannot agree on the interpretive con-
struction of the sudden and accidental exception to the pollution
exclusion clause. As more cases related to the problem are heard,
131. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
132. Greenburg, supra note 7, at 26. It is also estimated that cleaning up
the one thousand sites in the nation requiring urgent attention will cost at least
twenty-five billion dollars. Id.
133. Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 6, at 21.
134. Id. As a result, to pay for indemnification costs, insurance companies
have had to use surplus funds, which has an effect on all insurance policy (home-
owner, automobile, life, etc.) commitments. See generally Note, supra note 110, at
1278.
135. Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 6, at 21.
136. Id. Realized indemnification costs resulting from Superfund and liti-
gation requirements therefore are paid out from the profits from other policies.
28
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss2/4
POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE 401
and individual courts reach some consistency in their holdings,
forum shopping may result as insureds and insurers both look to
see where they can attain the most satisfactory decisions.'3 7 In-
surers, unwilling and unable to sustain the potential costs of cov-
erage for environmentally suspect insureds, will refuse to issue
policies as premium revenues fall short of risk assessments. This
in turn could force operators and facilities which handle hazard-
ous wastes and cannot obtain insurance coverage to cease being
able to operate as they will be unable to meet the financial re-
sponsibility requirements mandated by the RCRA. 13 8 In the
event that their operation had caused contamination or a pollut-
ing occurrence, the responsible party is no longer a viable source
of cleanup funds.' 39 Such a situation will further strain the envi-
ronmental cleanup effort as the EPA uses Superfund resources to
correct hazardous sites and seeks subsequent indemnification
from the site operators. If the operators are bankrupt, the
Superfund is depleted without corresponding reimbursement. 40
Fewer Superfund dollars translates into fewer hazardous waste
sites being remediated.
The "bitter pill" the courts and the hazardous waste causing
industries may have to swallow is the fact that to ensure long-run
availability of insurance coverage and pollution cleanup funds, a
high short-run price may have to be paid. This price may take the
137. Id. at 22.
138. See supra note 4. The RCRA requires owners and operators of facilities
which treat, store or dispose of hazardous wastes to maintain a variety of stan-
dards, including that of financial responsibility for corrective action in the event
of a polluting occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6). Often, the only way to meet
this criteria is through the use of liability insurance as permitted under CER-
CLA. ("Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold
harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this
section." CERCLA § 107(e)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1)). If a facility cannot
acquire coverage it will not be licensed to operate by the EPA.
139. To preclude the potential for facility operators going bankrupt, it has
been suggested that courts may sometimes look to insurance carriers to in effect
"bail out" the insureds. Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 6, at 22. The
insurance industry in turn attempted to limit its potential for liability by sug-
gesting legislation which would have (if it were passed) negated coverage for
CGL policies written prior to the 1980's that have triggered Superfund obliga-
tions. Such legislation has never been enacted. Id.
140. Superfund resources are further depleted simply by the litigation ex-
penses involved in environmental cases. In fact, evidence from early Superfund
cases shows that it sometimes costs as much, if not more, to litigate liability is-
sues and remedial procedures as it will to do the actual cleanup. Id. at 21. For
example, litigation expenses stemming from the Ottati Goss site in New Hamp-
shire have ranged between six million dollars and twenty million dollars. The
costs of implementing remedial action was estimated to be fifteen million dol-
lars. Id.
1991]
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form of higher operating costs or the potential closing of some
hazardous waste handling companies. However, the most cost-
effective way to lower pollution clean-up costs is to prevent the
event in the first place. Passing the bill to the insurance industry
may be a convenient short-run answer, but ultimately, if insurance
becomes too costly (or ceases to be available) the effect will be felt
on all handlers of hazardous wastes, not just those who have
caused contaminating events through their own negligence.
Therefore, the financial incentive to relax vigilance with regards
to potential environmental hazards or to allow foreseeable re-
peated polluting events to occur must be eliminated.
David A. Gaudioso
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